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JUSTICE DEPARTMENT STANDING TO SUE ON BEHALF
OF INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS:
THE BAYH AND KASTENMEIER PROPOSALS
INTRODUCTION
On January 15, 1979, Senator Birch Bayh and Representative Robert M.
Kastenmeier reintroduced bills (S. 10 and H.R. 10, respectively) authorizing
the Attorney General to sue on behalf of institutionalized persons whose
constitutionalized rights' are being violated.2 During the 95th Congress a similar
bill was approved by the House of Representatives, but the proposed legislation
subsequently died in the Senate.3
S. 10 and H.R. 10 are legislative responses to federal court decisions in
United States v. Solomon 4 and United States v. Mattson. 5 In Solomon the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the Attorney
General of the United States has no standing, absent specific statutory
authorization, to enjoin certain practices and policies of state mental health
officials that were allegedly in violation of the constitutional rights of mentally
retarded citizens. 6 In the Mattson case, a similar suit, filed against Montana's
Boulder River Hospital on behalf of mentally retarded individuals, was dismissed
by the district court in Montana. This decision was affirmed by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which reasoned that Congress had neither expressly
nor implicitly authorized the Attorney General to bring suit on behalf of the
institutionalized. 7
This note will consider the detrimental impact these cases have on those
institutionalized persons who are unable to protect themselves against infringements
of their most basic constitutional rights. In addition, the note will examine
both the need for legislation clearly authorizing the Attorney General to initiate
actions on behalf of institutionalized persons and the adequacy of the specific
remedies provided by S. 10 and H.R. 10.
1. See text accompanying notes 108 and 109 infra. See also note 2 infra.
2. S. 10, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Civil Rights of the Institutionalized,
S. Rep. No. 96-416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-9 (1979) [hereinafter cited as S. 101, and H.R. 10, 96th
Cong., Ist Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. H3645-46 (daily ed. May 23, 1979) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 101.
Under these two bills, the Attorney General may bring an action on behalf of prisoners, if such
persons are subjected to conditions depriving them of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution of the United States." All other institutionalized persons' rights could
be protected by means of Justice Department actions brought under the broader term "Constitution
or laws of the United States (emphasis added)."
3. Senator Birch Bayh (D. Ind.) stated on October 11, 1978:
[Tihere is a most important piece of legislation which we have not taken up.
[A] bill to authorize actions by the Attorney General to redress deprivations of
constitutional and other federally protected rights of institutionalized persons, which has been
on the Senate calender since late July, will not be considered in this session of the 95th
Congress by the Senate despite its strong bipartisan support-support reflected clearly by the
254-to-69 vote on the House companion bill and the I1 -to-6 vote in the Senate Judiciary
Committee.
124 Cong. Rec. S18251-52 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Bayh).
4. 563 F. 2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977), affg 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976).
5. 600 F. 2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979).
6. 563 F. 2d at 1123.
7. 600 F. 2d at 1299-1300.
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BACKGROUND OF S. 10 AND H.R. 10
Minimal Rights of the Institutionalized
In recent decisions, the federal courts have acknowledged that institutionalized
persons placed in state facilities have certain constitutional rights to which
they are entitled under the fourteenth amendment.8 Individuals placed in state
institutions may not be deprived of liberty without due process of law.9
All institutionalized persons have a right to food, a right not to be subject
to physical abuse and a right not to be placed in grossly insanitary
facilities. 10 These minimal rights are part of a broader right to a decent and
humane living environment which is guaranteed to such persons under the
United States Constitution. 11 In the landmark case of Wyatt v. Aderholt, 12
which affirmed, in part, the district court decision in Wyatt v. Stickney, 13 the
Fifth Circuit stated that the Constitution guarantees certain basic rights to
persons civilly committed to state mental institutions. 14 Stickney marked the
beginning of a series of lawsuits brought to secure basic rights for the
institutionalized. It was also in Stickney that Chief Judge Frank M. Johnson,
Jr. first ordered the Department of Justice to appear in the suit as amicus
curiae and to assist the court in enforcing federal standards. 15 Thereafter, the
Office of Special Litigation and the Office of Public Accommodations and
Facilities of the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department (acting as
both plaintiff-intervenor and initiator in various other suits) have continued to
challenge both inhumane conditions of confinement in state institutions and
the constitutionality of certain state commitment statutes.
16
8. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F. 2d 1305 (5th
Cir. 1974), revg in part and affg in part 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972) and 344 F. Supp.
387 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
9. Stickney stated:
When patients are so committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a constitutional
right to receive such individual treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to
be cured or to improve his or her mental condition . . . . Adequate and effective treatment
is constitutionally required because, absent treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a
penitentiary where one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense." . . . The purpose
of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care
or punishment. This is the only justification, from a constitutional standpoint, that allows civil
committments to mental institutions . . .
. To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement
is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very
fundamentals of due process.
325 F. Supp. at 784-85.
10. Cunningham v. Jones, 567.F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1977)(right to food); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571,
576 (8th Cir. 1968)(right not to be subject to physical abuse); Shapley v. Wolff, 568 F.2d 1310 (9th
Cir. 1978) and Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1342-43 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (right not to be
placed in grossly insanitary facilities).
11. Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304, 307-08 (8th Cir. 1971), affg 309 F. Supp. 362. See also Battle v.
Anderson, 594 F.2d 786 (10th Cir. 1979), in which the court expressed an interest in ascertaining
whether the state of Oklahoma had remedied substandard and inhumane conditions (in penal institutions)
resulting in unconstitutional deprivations of rights.
12. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. 325 F. Supp. 781, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1971-72), affd sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
14. 503 F.2d at 1310-13.
15. 325 F. Supp. at 786.
16. United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121
(4th Cir. 1977) affg 419 F. Supp. 358 (D. Md. 1976); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children
v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), sub nom. NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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The Fifth Circuit emphasized, in Gates v. Collier, 17 that prisoners are
entitled to decent living conditions when they are incarcerated in State
institutions. Collier stated:
The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth
Amendment, applicable to the State of Mississippi through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is not limited to specific acts
directed at selected individuals, but is equally pertinent to general conditions
of confinement that may prevail at a prison. 18
Subsequent cases have insisted that those in correctional institutions have a
right to be assigned to sanitary facilities. Unsafe and insanitary prison conditions
at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, the Fifth Circuit concluded,
violated the eighth amendment. 19
Aderholt and Stickney also indicate that where mentally ill or retarded
persons are civilly committed against their wishes to facilities for a specific
constitutionally permitted purpose, due process prohibits mere custodial care
in lieu of actual treatment. 20 A distinction must be made between the minimal
rights of those in state prisons and the minimal rights of those in special state
facilities for the treatment and care of such persons as the mentally ill, the
mentally retarded, or the elderly. Prisoners do not necessarily have a right to
treatment (unlike those individuals who are involuntarily committed for reasons
other than subjection to criminal penalties). 21
Certain rights, then, are afforded the institutionalized by the Constitution
itself. Significantly, the courts have maintained that to the extent that such
rights are of constitutional dimension, suits against officials are not barred by
the eleventh amendment. 22
17. 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974).
18. Id. at 1300-01.
19. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977).
20. 503 F.2d at 1312; 325 F. Supp. at 784-85. Although the Supreme Court has not definitely expressed
its view as to whether institutionalized persons in state mental hospitals or other non-penal institutions
have a "right to treatment" under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Chief Justice
Burger, in his concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,587-89 (1975) insisted:
In sum, I cannot accept the reasoning of the Court of Appeals and can discern no basis for
equating an involuntarily committed mental patient's unquestioned constitutional right not to
be confined without due process of law with a constitutional right to treatment. Given the
present state of medical knowledge regarding abnormal human behaviour and its treatment,
few things would be more fraught with peril than to irrevocably condition a State's power to
protect the mentally ill upon the providing of "such treatment as will give [them] a realistic
opportunity to be cured." Nor can I accept the theory that a State may lawfully confine an
individual thought to need treatment and justify that deprivation of liberty solely by providing
some treatment. Our concepts of due process would not tolerate such a "trade-off."
Chief Justice Burger, then, is the only Supreme Court Justice who has explicitly rejected the concept
of a right to treatment. Nonetheless, three members of the Supreme Court, Justice Brennan, Justice
Marshall, and Justice Stevens, have expressed approval for Aderholt and Stickney. Parham v. J.R.,
61 L.Ed.2d 101, 135 (1979). The holding of Aderholt concerning right to treatment has not been
overruled, despite differing views among the circuit. The First Circuit, for example, acknowledged the
holding of Aderholt but distinguished it on the facts in Harper v. Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121 (1st Cir.
1976).
21. 334 F. Supp. at 1342-43. See also 503 F.2d at 1308-09. With respect to prison conditions, the courts
have limited relief under the eighth and fourteenth amendments to conditions which offend contemporary
notions of decency and human dignity, shock the conscience, or are a grave and immediate threat to
health or physical well being. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974); Campbell v.
Beto, 460 F.2d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 1972); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968).
22. 503 F.2d at 1314; 357 F. Supp. at 765.
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Extent of Deprivations
Violations of institutionalized persons' rights have occurred throughout the
country and have not been restricted to any one area. In Morales v.
Turman 23 the district court pointed to abuses, including confinement in
homosexual dormitories and widespread beatings inflicted in a wholly arbitrary
fashion, at a Texas prison for juveniles. 24 The Aderholt court noted that Bryce
Hospital, a state mental hospital in Alabama, did not even provide its patients
with an adequate diet. As explained by the Court, "Malnutrition was a problem:
the United States described the food as 'com[ing] closer to "punishment" by
starvation' than nutrition. At Bryce, the food distribution and preparation
systems were unsanitary, and less than fifty cents per day per patient was
spent on food." ' 25 Other abuses were summarized by the court as follows:
There were severe health and safety problems: patients with open wounds and
inadequately treated skin diseases were in imminent danger of infection because
of the unsanitary conditions existing in the wards, such as permitting urine
and feces to remain on the floor . . . . Aides frequently put patients in
seclusion or under physical restraints without physicians' orders. One resident
had been regularly confined in a straightjacket for more than nine years ....
Seclusion rooms were large enough for one bed and a coffee can, which served
as a toilet. The patients suffered brutality, both at the hands of the aides
and at the hands of their fellow patients; testimony established that four
Partlow residents died due to under-staffing, lack of supervision, and bru-
tality.26
A federal district court in New York 27 grappled with abuses at New York's
Willowbrook State School for the Mentally Retarded where the evidence
revealed massive overdrugging of children, the loss of eyes, ears, and teeth by
children subjected to physical abuse by other students and the confinement of
a cerebral palsy victim at Willowbrook for sixteen years as the result of a
misdiagnosis of mental retardation. 28
Among the inhumane living conditions at the Louisiana State Penitentiary
at Angola were tremendously over-crowded facilities, serious fire and safety
hazards, twenty violent deaths within three years, 270 stabbings during the
same period of time, numerous "forcible rapes," inadequate medical care and
insanitary conditions in the main kitchen (as exemplified by the accumulation
of sewage and a serious rodent problem). 29
23. 364 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430
U.S. 322 (1977).
24. Id. at 170-74.
25. 503 F.2d at 1310.
26. Id. at 1310-11.
27. New York State Association for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973),
sub nom. NYSARC v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
28. Id. at 756. See also 125 Cong. Rec. S106 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Bentsen).
29. 547 F.2d at 1211. See also Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1977), where the Fifth Circuit
ruled that the conditions at Duval County Jail in Jacksonville, Florida were such as to violate its
prisoners' constitutional right to due process.
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Impact of Justice Department Involvement in Suits
Participation by the Justice Department in suits on behalf of the
institutionalized has resulted in significant improvements at state institutions.
For example, Mr. Stanley Brodsky of the American Psychological Association
testified before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary and noted:
In Wyatt v. Stickney in 1972, the Justice Department joined two other groups
in a successful suit against the Alabama Department of Mental Health. Among
other dramatic consequences of this action, living conditions for the patients
have greatly improved, staff-to-patient ratios have risen, and, perhaps most
important, a deinstitutionalization program has resulted in many patients being
released to their home communities. Now, 1,800 patients are in residence at
the State hospital, whereas 5 years ago 5,800 patients were confined. Per
patient expenditures have risen sixfold and a court-created human rights
committee monitors the continued efforts to meet minimum treatment and
living standards for the patients.30
Thus, as a result of federal intervention, mental patients at Alabama's Bryce
Hospital are receiving much improved care. At Mississippi's Parchman State
Prison, dilapidated and severely overcrowded camps have also been replaced
with modern facilities meeting recognized standards as a result of litigation
assisted by the Justice Department. 31 The Justice Department's involvement in
litigation concerning the Willowbrook State School3 2 produced positive results
as well. Mentally retarded persons at Willowbrook now receive more training
in a cleaner and less crowded environment. 33
A report on the civil rights of the institutionalized, prepared in 1979 by
the Senate's Committee on the Judiciary, comments further:
[Tihe Justice Department has also been involved in suits challenging the
constitutionality of several States' civil commitment statutes . . . . In every
state in which the United States participated in litigation challenging a State
commitment statute, the legislature responded by passing a new law, bringing
into constitutional compliance the substantive and procedural standards for
committing its citizens. 34
Barriers to Future Involvement of Justice Department
The Justice Department's authority to protect the rights of the institutionalized
has been severely eroded by the holdings in Solomon and Mattson that the
United States Attorney General has no standing to sue on behalf of the
30. Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on S. 1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1977) (statement of Stanley
Brodsky).
31. Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). See, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Civil Rights
of the Institutionalized, S. Rep. No. 96-416, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Report].
32. New York State Ass'n v. Rockefeller supra note 27.
33. Senate Report, supra note 31, at 11.
34. Id. at 13-14.
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institutionalized absent specific statutory authorization. Although the Attorney
General may intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a) and (b)
in suits brought by individual institutionalized persons to vindicate their civil
rights, the Department of Justice may not institute new suits. 35 In addition,
there is a danger that defendants may cause needless delay by objecting to
the United States' participation in suits as a plaintiff-intervenor. 36 Congress
has already granted the Attorney General power to intervene pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, but some litigants have attempted to
interpret the Solomon and Mattson decisions as precluding any participation
by the Justice Department in suits on behalf of the institutionalized. 37
Solomon and Mattson narrowly construe past cases in which the Supreme
Court has upheld the standing of the United States to initiate various civil
suits without express statutory authorization. In one line of cases, -beginning
with the 1895 decision of In re Debs 38 and culminating in the 1967 decision
of Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 39 the Supreme Court
permitted the Attorney General to sue for injunctive relief when obstructions
to commerce greatly inconvenienced citizens. Although criminal sanctions were
provided by the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899,40 the statute
did not provide for injunctive relief. In Wyandotte, therefore, the Court found
an implied right of action. Congress did not intend, the Court 6oncluded,
that remedies provided by the Act be exclusive. 41 The earlier decision of
In re Debs influenced subsequent judicial receptivity to implied federal rem-
edies.42 In the Debs case, the Supreme Court embraced the notion that the
Constitution implicitly authorized the United States to bring suit in its courts
to protect the public. Injunctive relief could be sought by the government, the
Court explained, in circumstances threatening to cripple the transport of
Chicago's mail. 43 Despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization of such
injunctive relief, the Court found a duty on the part of the government to
remove obstructions to commerce to the extent Congress had activated its
commerce power by oversight of interstate railroads. 44 Representative Robert
Drinan recently expressed the view that such precedents as Debs and Wyan-
dotte "would appear applicable to civil actions brought by the Government
involving deprivations of certain federal constitutional and statutory rights of
institutionalized persons to the extent Congress has made such conduct arguably
a criminal offense . . . ,,45
35. An additional danger is pointed out id. at 17, where it is stated that "defendants who were previously
instituting voluntary changes to avoid suit by the Attorney General will have little incentive to continue,
in the absence of any real threat of litigation."
36. Id. at 17, where it is stated that "suits in which the United States is currently participating as ami-
cus or plaintiff-intervenor will be disrupted by defendants' motions to dismiss the United States as a
party, based on the Solomon and Mattson decisions."
37. Id.
38. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
39. 389 U.S. 191 (1967).
40. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403-04, 406-09, 411-15, 418, 502, 549, 686, 687 (1970).
41. 389 U.S. at 200-01.
42. Note, Implied Executive Authority to Bring Suit to Enforce the Rights of Institutionalized Citi-
zens, 26 Cath. U. L. Rev. 794, 799 (1977).
43. Id. at 797-98.
44. 158 U.S. at 582.
45. 125 Cong. Rec. H3,636 (daily ed. May 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Drinan).
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This reasoning was not accepted in the Solomon or Mattson decisions,
which were reluctant to accept a broad application of Debs for two separate
reasons. The first and foremost worry of the appellate courts in Solomon and
Mattson was that the doctrine of separation of powers, coupled with the failure
of Congress to approve bills introduced for the purpose of granting the Attorney
General standing to sue on behalf of the institutionalized, precluded any finding
of an implied right of action. For instance, the Solomon opinion cited the
famous "Steel Seizure Case," which held that without statutory or constitutional
authority to seize the nation's steel mills any such seizure by the President
was unconstitutional.46 Since the Constitution assigned legislative powers to the
Congress, Solomon reasoned, the executive branch may not initiate suits without
explicit Congressional authorization by statute. Solomon's reliance on
separation of powers doctrine in these situations has been criticized by the
Third Circuit recently and may indicate a forthcoming split in the circuits on
this issue.47
The Solomon court indicated that it might have been more receptive to
the Government's argument that, under Debs, an implied right of action could
be found if the Congress had not specifically declined to authorize the Attorney
General to sue on behalf of institutionalized persons. Solomon stated that
"[iln the instant case, if we were to read Debs to authorize this suit, we
would .. .authorize the executive to do what Congress has repeatedly declined
to authorize him to do [as indicated by Senate inaction on S. 10's predeces-
sors]."'48 Mattson similarly cited the "Steel Seizure Case" for the proposition
that the delicate equilibrium among the several branches of government would
be disrupted by an attempt of the executive branch to encroach upon Congress'
legislative realm. 49 The Mattson court explains:
Institution of the suit represents a laudable effort on the part of the United
States to ensure that those needing special care and treatment receive it ....
But we must also be concerned with . . . maintaining a viable separation of
powers between the branches of government so that one does not intrude
unnecessarily into the sphere of another.50
It is ironic that these courts might have been more inclined to find an implied
right of action and thus to reverse rather than affirm the district court opinions
in Solomon and Mattson had the Congress not even considered S. 10, H.R.
10, and their predecessors. Inaction by the Senate has been construed by
federal appellate courts as Congressional refusal to grant the Attorney General
standing to sue on behalf of the institutionalized.
46. 563 F.2d at 1128-29.
47. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School, Nos. 75-1490, 78-1564, 78-1602 (3rd Cir. 1979).
48. Id. at 1129.
49. 600 F.2d at 1301, where it is stated:
The need to protect the individual branches of government from intrusion is a task not to be
taken lightly. Just as any potential abuse of the judiciary must be curbed, any attempt by the
executive branch to encroach in an area properly reserved for Congress "must be scrutinized
with caution, for ;what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952).
It is on these interwoven considerations of separation of powers and compliance with
procedural requirements that we reluctantly make our decision.
50. Id. at 1297.
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A second concern expressed by the courts in the Solomon and Mattson cases
regards the impact of an implied right of action on federalism. It is significant
that the appellate courts in these cases gave much less weight to this second
consideration than did the district courts. For example, the federal district
court in Solomon insisted:
Just as nonstatutory executive power to sue based on a broad notion of burdens
on interstate commerce insinuates the federal legal bureaucracy into practically
every conceivable affair of state policy-making, thereby destroying federalism,
so too does a power to sue based on notions of deprivation of thirteenth and
fourteenth amendment rights. Such a blow to federalism might arguably be
justified if absolutely no other adequate protection for fourteenth amendment
rights were available. 51
The district court further concluded that there were alternative ways to protect
the fourteenth amendment rights of the institutionalized, since theoretically
such individuals themselves could bring suit.52 This court did not consider the
possibility that many institutionalized persons are intellectually or emotionally
incapable of recognizing their constitutional rights. In contrast, the appellate
court in Solomon merely alludes to the issue of federalism by noting that the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 53 does not
explicitly grant the United States the authority to enforce a state's compliance
with federal standards for treatment of persons with developmental
disabilities. 54 This court explained that the conference committee report explaining
that Act explicitly refers to the use of state judicial forums rather than the
federal judicial forum where the United States customarily brings suit.55 Like-
wise, in Mattson the Ninth Circuit merely stated that with respect to 18
U.S.C. § 245,56 which delineates the responsibilities of the state and federal
government in enforcing certain civil rights matters, "the states have primary
responsibility to enforce the prosecution of constitutional rights violations. '57
Since the federal courts have held that the Justice Department may not
initiate suits on behalf of the institutionalized, only a federal statute explicity
granting the Attorney General standing in such cases will adequately protect
persons residing in countless institutions from egregious constitutional deprivations.
51. 419 F. Supp. at 357.
52. Id.
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6010-12 (1976).
54. 563 F.2d at 1125.
55. Id.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1976).
57. 600 F.2d at 1297 & n.l.
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PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Initial Proposals
During the first session of the Ninety-Fifth Congress, three bills were
proposed in the House of Representatives for the purpose of granting explicit
authority to the Attorney General to bring suit in federal court wherever there
was reasonable cause to believe that constitutional rights of institutionalized
persons were being violated. 58 A corresponding bill, S. 1393, was introduced
in the Senate during the 95th Congress. 59 Despite passage of a House bill, 6 0
the legislation died due to inaction in the Senate.
Legislative Texts of H.R. 10 and S. 10
H.R. 10, a bill with similar text and objectives to that passed by the
House during the 95th Congress, was approved on May 23, 1979. It is
anticipated that S. 10, which is substantially the same as the Senate bill
introduced in the 95th Congress, will reach the Senate floor this year.* The
Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
has recommended passage of the bill, and the Judiciary Committee as a whole
has approved the test of the proposed Legislation. 61
A. Provisions Authorizing Attorney General to Initiate Suit
The key provision in H.R. 1062 is section 2, which grants the Attorney
General statutory authority to initiate a suit pursuant to state action63 resulting
in conditions which cause institutionalized persons to "suffer grievous harm"
and which result in deprivations of constitutionally guaranteed rights.64 Such
*EDITOR'S NOTE: S. 10 was passed by the Senate on February 28, 1980, after the following three
floor amendments were attached: First, Section 2(a)(2) now stipulates that notice of an investigation of a
state institution must be delivered to state officials at least seven days prior to actual commencement of
such investigation. Second, section 3(a)(2) is another floor amendment which was adopted and reads:
The Attorney General shall not file a motion to intervene [under the first portion of section
3] . . . before one hundred and eighty days after the commencement of the action, except that
if the court determines it would be in the best interests of all parties to the litigation, the court
may shorten or waive the time period.
Third, a new section of the bill provides that the provisions of the Senate bill are not to be given precedence
over statutory authority previously granted the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. This section
is now section 10, and section 10 of the Senate bill as it was approved in committee is now section 11.
(See footnote 102).
58. H.R. 2439, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 5791, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., (1977); H.R. 9400, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). For the text of these bills, see Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons:
Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 285-88 (1977).
59. S. 1393, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). For the text of this bill, see Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons. S. Rep. No. 95-1056, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3-5 (1978).
61. On November 15, 1979 S. 10 was voted out of committee. See 125 Cong. Rec. D155 (daily ed.
November 15, 1979).
62. H.R. 10, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
63. In the recent case of Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), the Supreme Court held that
state action must consist of active rather than passive authorization or encouragement by the state.
A state's mere acquiesence in a private action does not constitute state action.
64. 125 Cong. Rec. H3,645 (daily ed. May 23, 1979).
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deprivations, however, must also be "pursuant to a pattern or practice of
resistance to the full enjoyment of such [constitutional] rights, privileges and
immunities . . . "65 The House bill thus limits the circumstances in which
suits may be brought to those where there have been repeated violations of
constitutional rights rather than isolated deprivation of such rights.
The corresponding provision in the Senate bill, 66 while substantially the
same as section 2 of H.R. 10, requires in addition that the requisite state
action result in "egregious or flagrant conditions (conditions which are willful
or wanton or conditions of gross neglect) which deprive such [institutionalized]
persons of any [constitutional] rights . . . "67 Thus, the Senate bill reflects a
more cautious approach than does the House bill as to what conditions in an
institution will justify a suit brought by the Justice Department. The Senate
Committee on the Judiciary's 1979 report on the civil rights of the institutionalized
adds, "These additional descriptive terms are intended to parallel the limitations
that have been applied to actions brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and similar
rights enforcement statutes. '68
B. Definitions of Institutions
Both the House and Senate bills include within their definitions of an
institution a facility which houses or provides care for the mentally ill, disabled,
retarded, chronically ill or handicapped. 69 In addition, jails, prisons, correctional
facilities, pretrial detention facilities and custodial facilities are considered
institutions for purposes of H.R. 10 and S. 10.70 Further, both proposals
specifically state that facilities in which juveniles are placed awaiting trail, in
which juveniles reside for purposes of receiving care or treatment, or in which
juveniles live for other State purposes are regarded as institutions. 71 S. 10,
however, stipulates that schools providing elementary or secondary education
for juveniles who are not delinquent, handicapped, or neglected may not be
considered institutions, despite any affiliation with a state.72
The definitions of institution provided by H.R. 10 and S. 10 include only
a facility "which is owned, operated, or managed by, or provides services on
behalf of any State or political subdivision of a State . . . -73 State action,
65. Id. This provision serves to limit actions to those cases in which there been repeated constitutional
infractions and in which substantial numbers of institutionalized persons are being abused.
66. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 1.
67. 125 Cong. Rec. S105 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1979).
68. Senate Report, supra note 31, at 29.
69. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § I and S. 10 supra note 2, at § 8.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 8.
73. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 1 and S. 10 supra note 2, at § 8.
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therefore, is required before the Justice Department may participate in the
suits contemplated by these bills. If a state contracts with a private facility
"to fulfill functions traditionally performed by the State,"' 74 residents of such
an institution would be protected by the bills. Nonetheless, under the Senate
bill, the mere licensing of private facilities by a state or the mere "licensure
and receipt of monies under Title XVI, Title XVIII or Title XIX [of the
Social Security Act]"' 75 does not satisfy the requirement of state action. In this
respect, the Senate bill is more restrictive than H.R. 10. It must be pointed
out, of course, that neither the House nor Senate bills purport to do more
than grant the Attorney General standing to sue pursuant to a cause of action
already permitted under the fourteenth amendment, 76 which itself requires state
action to become operative.
C. Provisions for Intervention of Attorney General
A third major difference between the two bills is that the House bill does
not specifically provide for the intervention of the Justice Department in suits
brought by others, in contrast to the explicit provision for intervention by the
Attorney General in the Senate bill.77 Section 3 of S. 10 states that the
Attorney General may intervene in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure when he has reasonable cause to believe that a state is depriving
institutionalized persons of rights, secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States, pursuant to a "pattern or practice" of deprivation resulting in
grievous harm. 78 Although H.R. 10 does not concern itself with the matter of
intervention, it implicitly allows intervention pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a) and (b). 79 As a practical matter, the wording employed in
the Senate bill may limit the Attorney General's intervention in suits vindicating
rights of the institutionalized to those cases in which deprivations result in
grievous harm.
74. 125 Cong. Rec. H3,647 where Representative Railback explains:
Supposing a State closes down a State institution such as a nursing home or an orphanage or
some other facility, and places the residents in other facilities, pays for the residents, make
referrals to those facilities and acts as a partner with the facility. It can be said that the
institution is acting on behalf of the state.
75. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 8.
76. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I reads in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
77. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 3.
78. Id.
79. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a) and (b) reads:
(a) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when
a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
(b) Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when
a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a
party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order
administered by a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order,
requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer
or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
Accord, 125 Cong. Rec. H3643 (daily ed. May 23, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Gudger).
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S. 10, moreover, requires the Attorney General to certify to the court, at
least fifteen days prior to intervention, that he has provided written notification
of the following to the chief executive and legal officers of the state and the
director of the institution: (1) the alleged conditions violating constitutional
standards, (2) supporting facts giving rise to the conditions, "including the
dates and time periods during which the alleged conditions and pattern or
practice of resistance occurred" and (3) the minimum corrective measures
needed. 80
D. Certification Requirements for Initiation of Suits
Another area of contrast between the House and Senate bills concerns
their respective sections requiring certification before initiation of suits. The
Senate bill provides that the Attorney General must certify, prior to initiating
suit on behalf of the institutionalized, "that he has endeavored to eliminate
the alleged [unconstitutional] conditions and pattern of resistance [to full
enjoyment of constitutional rights] by informal methods . . . "81 This attempt
at informal dispute resolution would not be required by the House bill. Both
section 3(a)(2) 82 of H.R. 10 and section 2(a)(2)8 3 of S. 10 would require the
Attorney General to certify that he had made a reasonable effort to consult
with state officials, such as the governor and state attorney general, and the
director of the offending institution "regarding assistance which may be available
from the United States"8 4 to help in correcting the problems. The Senate bill
is more specific than H.R. 10 to the extent that only S. 10 stipulates that
any federal assistance tendered must include any available financial or technical
assistance.8 5 H.R. 10 requires the Attorney General to certify that, at least
thirty days previously, he has informed the state's chief executive and legal
officers and the director of the institution of "the identity of all persons
reasonably suspected of being involved in causing the alleged pattern or practice
of deprivations ... 86 Under the Senate bill, the Attorney General must
certify the same to the court at least fifty-six days prior to initiation of the
suit.87 Both bills also require that the Attorney General certify to the court
that he has priviously notified (thirty days in advance under H.R. 10 and
fifty-six days in advance under S. 10) the chief executive and legal officers
of the state, as well as the director of the offending institution, of the alleged
constitutional violations, the dates of such infringements, and the measures
needed to remedy the situation.88 The Senate bill only provides for notification
concerning minimum measures needed to alleviate the egregious conditions.89
80. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 3.
81. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 2.
82. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 3(a)(2).
83. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 2(a)(2).
84. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 3(a)(2) and S. 10 supra note 2, at § 2(a)(2)(B).
85. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 2(a)(2)(A).
86. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 3(a)(1)(B).
87. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 2(a)(1)(B).
88. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 3 and S. 10 supra note 2, at § 2.
89. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 2(a)(1)(c).
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E. Protection of Grievants from Reprisals
The House and Senate bills differ as to the degree of protection they give
to individuals who report suspected constitutional violations. Only S. 10 states,
"No person reporting conditions which may constitute a violation under this
Act shall be subjected to retaliation in any manner for so reporting." 90 This
protects persons reporting the condition of any institution covered by the bill.
Thus the Senate bill provides at least some protection to non-prisoners reporting
violations, while the House bill provides none. On the other hand, provisions
in both H.R. 10 and S. 10 protect those reporting conditions in penal institutions
from such reprisals. 91 These proposals require that the Attorney General, within
180 days of passage of the legislation, establish comprehensive "minimum
standards" for state grievance systems and procedures used in state penal
facilities.92 State compliance with these standards would, however, be voluntary
under the Senate bill. 93 Section 4(c) of H.R. 10 and section 5(a)(1) and (2)
of S. 10 encourage a prisoner's use of "administrative remedies" in substantial
compliance with such minimum standards before actions brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are litigated in the courts. 94
F. Attorney General's Annual Report to Congress
Provisions regarding the Attorney General's annual report to Congress have
been incorporated into both bills. They provide that in his report to the
Congress, the Attorney General must include "a statement of the number,
variety, and outcome of all actions instituted pursuant to this Act . . . "95 Since
the Senate bill explicitly provides for intervention as well as initiation of suit,
S. 10 requires him to include in his report the "history of, precise reasons
for, and procedures followed in [either] initiation or intervention in each
case" 96 in which the Justice Department seeks to vindicate the rights of the
institutionalized. H.R. 10 does not require a statement to the Congress
concerning actions in which the Attorney General merely intervenes, 97 since
that bill has no provision for intervention. Both the Senate and House bills
also require a detailed explanation of the manner in which the Justice
Department processes complaints from persons in penal institutions, 98 but only
S. 10 requires such an explanation with regard to complaints regarding
conditions in other institutions.99 Only the House bill provides for a statement,
in the report, regarding the impact of H.R. 10's provisions concerning grievance
resolution of prisoner complaints, on the workload of federal courts and
the quality of the grievance resolution process in penal institutions.100 On
the other hand, only the Senate proposal specifically requires statements, in
90. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 4.
91. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 4(a)(4) and S. 10 supra note 2, at § 5(b)(2)(D).
92. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 4(a) and S. 10 supra note 2, at § 5(b)(2)(B).
93. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 5(d). See Senate Report, supra note 31, at 35.
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides protection for individuals whose civil rights are violated under color
of state law.
95. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 5 and S. 10 supra note 2, at § 6.
96. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 6.
97. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 5 does not require a statement concerning intervention in the Attorney
Generals annual report.
98. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 6(b) and H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 5(2).
99. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 6(b).
100. H.R. 10 supra note 2, at § 5(3).
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the report, concerning estimated costs incurred by the states as a result of
the legislation, assistance made available by the federal government for purposes
of correcting conditions in institutions, and "the progress made in each Federal
institution toward meeting existing promulgated standards for such institutions
or constitutionally guaranteed minima."101
G. Provisions of Senate Bill Not Included in House Bill
There are several portions of the Senate bill which are not to be found
in the House bill. For example, only S. 10 provides, "Provisions of this Act
shall not authorize promulgation of regulations defining standards of
ca re."'102 This sentence is designed to prevent "right to treatment" regulations
and reflects the relatively cautious attitudes of those senators fearful of granting
any more authority to the Attorney General than is absolutely necessary to
fulfill the purpose of the bill. In addition, the Senate bill stipulates that the
Comptroller General of the United States must prepare a report of "the
adequacy of programs of financial, technical, or other assistance" 103 currently
available to the states from the federal government to assist in correcting
conditions resulting in unconstitutional deprivations at institutions. 104 A
"Sense of the Congress" resolution incorporated into the Senate bill would
also express a desire that funds not be redirected from "one program to
another or from one State to another." 105 This provision would, however, be
in no way binding. 106 It should also be pointed out that S. 10 alone explicitly
states that, in those suits contemplated by the proposed legislation, the prevailing
party (other than the United States) may be permitted a reasonable attorney's
fee at the discretion of the court. 10 7
H. Scope of Protection Granted Institutionalized Persons
S. 10 and H.R. 10 both restrict actions to protect the rights of prisoners
to those cases in which an institution's conditions deprive them of "rights,
privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution of the United
States." 108 No relief will be available under the broader term "Constitution
or laws of the United States (emphasis added)"' 10 9 which covers all other
institutionalized persons. 110 Although those institutionalized persons who are
not prisoners may, pursuant to the proposed legislation, have actions brought
on their behalf by the Justice Department to vindicate federal statutory rights
which are not explicitly grounded in the Constitution, such statutory rights
would be enforced against the states through the fourteenth amendment. In a
very real sense, therefore, these rights may be categorized as constitutional
rights.
101. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 6.
102. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 10. Editor's note: As of Feb. 28, 1980 § 10 has become § 11.
103. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 7.
104. Id.
105. S. 10 supra note 2, at § 9.
106. Senate Report, supra note 31, at 37.
107. S. 10 supra note 2, at §§ 1 and 3(d).
108. S. 10 supra note 2, at §§ 1 and 8(a)(2)(B) and H.R. 10 supra note 2, at §§ 2 and I(B)(ii). See
also Senate Report, supra note 31, at 30 and House Comm. on the Judiciary, Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons, H.R. Rep. No. 96-80, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1979).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Arguments in Favor of Proposed Legislation
Proponents of the legislation have presented some compelling reasons why
the bills would have a positive impact on the institutionalized. First, the Justice
Department has exceptional legal resources available to aid institutionalized
persons in vindication of their constitutional rights."' l Since the proposed
legislation is directed toward the alleviation of the most shocking and
dehumanizing conditions in some of our country's institutions, the leading law
enforcement agency of the country should play an active role in correcting
these widespread abuses. As a report on the civil rights of the institutionalized
prepared by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary points out, "The Justice
Department's access to the investigative resources of the FBI, the technical
advice of other federal agencies and the professional assistance of nationally
recognized experts in the field of institutional care, enable it to develop a
comprehensive record for adjudicating courts." 112
The proposed bills would also provide for more effective protection of
institutionalized persons unable to protect their own rights. There are several
reasons why many institutionalized persons are unable to secure their constitutional
rights. First, many institutionalized individuals are simply not aware of their
rights. When one considers the physical and social isolation experienced by
many of the institutionalized, including residents at nursing homes and inmates
in penal institutions, it is easier to understand that many such persons are
not knowledgeable concerning legal alternatives available to them. In addition,
mentally retarded juveniles in state-operated boarding schools and mentally or
emotionally ill patients in hospitals may not be capable of instituting appropriate
suits on their own behalf.
A second obstacle encountered by potential litigants residing in institutional
facilities is a lack of funds. Given the enormous costs of litigation in our
society, it is not reasonable to expect that most persons whose rights are being
violated in the aforementioned facilities are able to pay legal expenses. According
to the Senate Judiciary Committee's report on the civil rights of the
institutionalized:
Most institutionalized persons are poor; many are indigent; none possess the
resources necessary to finance litigation challenging systematic, institution-wide
abuse. The cost of hiring experts to investigate, document, evaluate, and present
testimony on the adequacy of institutional conditions is beyond the means of
the most affluent institutionalized individuals.
In light of the enormous resources required to mount and sustain protracted
litigation necessary to secure institution-wide relief, it is not surprising that
virtually every suit dealing with the rights of the mentally disabled has been
brought with the assistance of the Justice Department."l 3
111. Senate Report, supra note 31, at 24-25
112. Id.
113. Id. at 20.
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Not only will the continued participation of the Justice Department ease the
financial burden for these individuals but it will also promote judicial economy
and pave the way for consolidation of similar suits. Courts have already
promoted consolidation of individual complaints in this fashion. 114
Third, some persons are dependent for food and shelter on the very
institutions which violate their civil liberties. It follows, then, that such individuals
are not likely to bring suits on their own behalf for fear of retaliation by
those on whom they are dependent. In fact, the House and Senate bills
explicitly recognize this problem in that they make provisions for state grievance
procedures to protect prisoners against reprisals. 115 For similar reasons, S. 10
also forbids retaliation against those reporting conditions within any institution
covered by the bill.1 16
A fourth consideration is that parents and relatives often fail to protect
the rights of institutionalized persons because of embarrassment and fear of
publicity. The fact that the institutionalized are residing in facilities away
from their families points to the social isolation of many persons in custodial
or penal facilities. It is imperative, therefore, that the Attorney General not
only be able to intervene in suits brought by the institutionalized themselves
but also that he be granted standing to initiate suits on behalf of the
institutionalized.
Since the two bills only allow the Attorney General to bring suit when
states have repeatedly denied the institutionalized their rights through a "pattern
of practice" of deprivation, the Justice Department may only vindicate the
rights of institutionalized persons when the states have repeatedly failed to act
on behalf of the individuals involved. Nonetheless, it is important that the
Justice Department be able to counteract state inertia preventing prompt
handling of institutional abuses.
Arguments against Proposed Legislation
A chief concern of opponents of the proposed legislation is that it will
lead to unwarranted federal intrusions into state matters. In short, they maintain
that our concept of federalism will be further eroded.11 7 This concern seems
to be unjustified in that H.R. 10 and S. 10 require extensive consultation
between the United States Attorney General and key state officials.1 8 Senators
Thurmond, Laxalt, Cochran and Simpson, opponents of the proposed legislation,
argue, "S. 10 is based on two assumptions: (1) that states are unwilling and
incapable of protecting their institutionalized citizens and (2) that the Attorney
General is in the best position to protect these citizens. Both assumptions are
incorrect." 119 While the states have the primary responsibility for maintaining
high standards of care within state institutions, state action resulting in a
114. Id. at 23-24.
115. See text accompanying notes 91-94.
116. See text accompanying note 90.
117. Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts. Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 525-36 (1977). The state attorneys-general have almost unanimously
opposed H.R. 10, S. 10, and their predecessors asan intrusion into areas of primarily state interest.
118. H.R. 10 supra note 2, § 3 and S. 10 supra note 2, § 2.
119. Senate Report, supra note 31, at 44.
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"pattern or practice" of institutional deprivations of basic constitutional rights
must not go unchecked. The vital role the states play in our federal system
of government must always be respected. Compliance with the Constitution,
however, does not conflict with reasonable state autonomy.
Opponents of the bills would apparently leave protection of the constitutional
rights of the institutionalized to public interest lawyers alone. Due to the
understaffing and lack of resources of many legal aid programs, 120 this
alternative is unacceptable to those committed to providing more humane living
environments for those in institutions. Similarly, public interest lawyers simply
cannot match the resources available to state defendants.
During a 1977 hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Professor Alan Stone, a professor of
law and psychiatry at Harvard University, insisted that states should be allowed
to devise various solutions to problems facing institutionalized persons. 121 In
his view, the federal government should not impose one particular solution on
institutions in various parts of the country. 122 Although Professor Stone
expressed his opposition to the legislation, he stated his belief that state
attorneys general would not take an active part in eliminating institutional
abuses. 123 In his opinion, public interest lawyers should continue to play the
leading role in bringing suit on behalf of the institutionalized. As mentioned
above, this is not a satisfactory answer in light of the limited resources of
legal aid programs.
The most disturbing argument used by opponents of H.R. 10 and S. 10,
however, is that prisoners who will benefit from the bills will be unfairly
advantaged.124 The insensitivity of this argument is born out by the documentation
of the countless stabbings, homosexual rapes, and murders perpetrated on
inmates of overstaffed and underfinanced correctional facilities. 125 Moreover,
both H.R. 10 and S. 10 have been so drafted as to provide less protection
for prisoners than for other institutionalized persons. 126
CONCLUSION
H.R. 10 and S. 10 are bills which would make available to abused residents
of various institutions the legal protection afforded by the active participation
of the Justice Department in suits vindicating the civil rights of such persons.
That such protection is necessary is made clear by both the inhumane living
120. Id. at 21.
121. Civil Rights of Instiitutionalized Persons. Hearings on S. 1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., ist Sess. 397 (1978).
122. Id. at 402.
123. Id. at 400.
124. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons, S. Rep. No. 95-1056, 95th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 38 (1978), where Senators Strom Thurmond, William L. Scott, and Paul Laxalt
express the view that " [s]hould an irresistable impulse to legislate in this area prevail, however, a
minimal improvement to the bill would be an amendment to eliminate jails, prisons, and correctional
facilities from its coverage . . . "
125. E.g.,: Civil Rights for Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on H.R. 2439 and H.R. 5791 Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977); and Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons: Hearings on
S. 1393 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong.,. 1st Sess. (1977).
126. See text following notes 108-10.
[Vol. 7: 140
Justice Department Standing
conditions which have been documented in various institutions across the nation
and the significant improvements which have resulted from the Justice
Department's involvement in suits brought against such institutions during the
early 1970's. Up to the present time, the Attorney General has also intervened
in actions brought by private citizens and contributed to the prompt resolution
of cases that had previously threatened to drag on for years. 127
Of the two bills, H.R. 10 reflects less cautious draftsmanship and may
provide slightly greater overall coverage for institutionalized persons. In particular,
H.R. 10, in contrast to S. 10, does not place limitations on the Attorney
General's authority to intervene in suits brought by the institutionalized. Thus,
H.R. 10 is a more satisfactory bill than S. 10. Nonetheless, both would grant
the Attorney General standing to bring suit on behalf of the institutionalized.
Whichever form the Congress ultimately adopts, the legislation will have a
positive impact on the operation of countless institutions and help guarantee
the continued protection of vital constitutional rights.
Robert F. McBirney
B.A., Loyola Marymount University, 1978; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame
Law School, 1981.
127. Senate Report, supra note 31, at 15-16.
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